According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other version, which resembles the form in which the argument was initially presented by Putnam and Boyd, remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. (...) Finally, we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne presents a substantially rewritten and updated edition of his most celebrated book. No other work has made a more powerful case for the probability of the existence of God. Swinburne gives a rigorous and penetrating analysis of the most important arguments for theism: the cosmological argument; arguments from the existence of laws of nature and the 'fine-tuning' of the universe; from the occurrence of consciousness and moral awareness; and from miracles and religious experience. He claims that (...) while none of these arguments are deductively valid, they do give inductive support to theism and that, even when the argument from evil is weighed against them, taken together they offer good grounds to support the probability that there is a God. The overall structure of the discussion and its conclusion have been retained for this new edition, but much has been changed in order to strengthen the argumentation and to take account of Swinburne's subsequent work on the nature of consciousness and the problem of evil, and of the latest philosophical and scientific writing, especially in respect of the laws of nature and the argument from fine-tuning. This is now the definitive version of a classic in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

According to the no miracles argument, scientific realism provides the only satisfactory explanation of the predictive success of science. It is argued in the present article that a different explanatory strategy, based on the posit of strong limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available empirical data, offers a more convincing understanding of scientific success.

"This book is about miracles -- what they are, what would count as evidence that they have occurred. It is not primarily concerned with historical evidence about whether certain particular miracles (such as Christ rising from the dead or walking on water) have occurred, but it is primarily concerned with whether historical evidence could show anything about such things and whether it matters if it can. It is concerned with the framework within which a historical debate must be (...) conducted. It contains a selection of writings written from different viewpoints by philosophers, classical and modern. The reader is left to form his or her own view on who wins the argument." [Introduction]. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne presents a substantially rewritten and updated edition of his most celebrated book. No other work has made a more powerful case for the probability of the existence of God. Swinburne gives a rigorous and penetrating analysis of the most important arguments for theism: the cosmological argument; arguments from the existence of laws of nature and the 'fine-tuning' of the universe; from the occurrence of consciousness and moral awareness; and from miracles and religious experience. He claims that (...) while none of these arguments are deductively valid, they do give inductive support to theism and that, even when the argument from evil is weighed against them, taken together they offer good grounds to support the probability that there is a God. The overall structure of the discussion and its conclusion have been retained for this new edition, but much has been changed in order to strengthen the argumentation and to take account of Swinburne's subsequent work on the nature of consciousness and the problem of evil, and of the latest philosophical and scientific writing, especially in respect of the laws of nature and the argument from fine-tuning. This is now the definitive version of a classic in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

AS AGAINST HUME’S VIEW THAT "A MIRACLE CAN NEVER BE PROVED SO AS TO BE THE FOUNDATION OF A SYSTEM OF RELIGION" I ARGUE THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES CAN BE DEFENDED ON PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS, THAT THERE IS HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF CERTAIN MIRACLES AND THAT SUCH MIRACLES CAN IN FACT GIVE GROUNDS FOR THE PREFERENCE OF ONE SYSTEM OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF OVER ANOTHER.

Substantially re-written and updated, this edition of 'The Existence of God' presents arguments such as the existence of the laws of nature, 'fine-tuning' of the universe, moral awareness and evidence of miracles, to prove the case that there is a God.

George Schlesinger has recently presented a reply to Hume’s argument concerning miracles. Schlesinger argues that probability theory and some simple assumptions about miracles show that testimony for a miracle increases the probability of God existing; furthermore this testimony can raise the probability of God existing enough that it is rational to believe that God exists. I argue that one of the assumptions that Schlesinger makes is false, and that the justification Schlesinger gives for it does not succeed. Thus (...) I claim Schlesinger’s reply to Hume fails. (shrink)

A minor philosophical industry has sprung up in recent years defending the possibility and epistemic utility of miracles: supernatural interventions in the world by a Christian God. By examining some staples of science fiction, this chapter finds a way to agree: miracles are possible, and could tell us something about reality. Nobody is sure exactly what David Hume himself thought, but there is an identifiable Humean tradition on miracles. It makes two main points. First, by definition a (...) miracle is in some relevant sense beyond what the laws of nature can describe and explain. The second point is intended to generally undermine claims of an established marvel which is contrary to our understanding of the laws of nature; to prevent a miracle claim even getting a toehold. The chapter then focuses on three miracle monger's favorite Sci‐Fi things: time travel, other dimensions, and simulations. (shrink)

A recent discussion of Hume’s argument concerning the rationality of accepting a belief that a miracle has occurred is given by J. L. Mackie in The Miracle of Theism. Mackie believes that Hume’s argument is essentially correct, although he attempts to clarify and strengthen it. Any version of Hume’s argument depends upon one’s conception of miracles and laws of nature; I will argue that Mackie commits a simple logical error and that given his conception of laws of nature and (...) miracles there is no reason to reject rational belief in miracles. (shrink)

According to the no miracles argument, scientific realism provides the only satisfactory explanation of the predictive success of science. It is argued in the present article that a different explanatory strategy, based on the posit of limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available empirical data, offers a more convincing understanding of scientific success.

Wittgenstein, in his characteristic way of indirectly bringing us to see an important feature in human life, said: ‘… art shows us the miracles of nature… We say: “Just look at it opening out!” This essay discusses how works of art ‘blossom’ and thus elicit an imaginative human response. Its various parts focus on the connected theme that some sensible component is essential to the production and comprehension of art. Each part, however, investigates a different aspect of the theme (...) and could stand on its own. What will be argued about this aesthetic factor in art will also be shown to cast light on our understanding of certain narrative texts and ceremonial acts of religion. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce is not known for waxing theological. Certainly, he has various writings that may be classed under the head of natural theology or the philosophy of religion, among them "Evolutionary Love", a critique of Hume on miracles, and "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God". Numerous Peirce scholars have endeavored to give expression to Peirce's philosophy of religion. Other manuscripts are suggestive of his religious practices and of how he viewed his religious beliefs (viz., as heterodox (...) if not... (shrink)

Memory is everywhere in Blade Runner 2049. From the dead tree that serves as a memorial and a site of remembrance (“Who keeps a dead tree?”), to the ‘flashbulb’ memories individuals hold about the moment of the ‘blackout’, when all the electronic stores of data were irretrievably erased (“everyone remembers where they were at the blackout”). Indeed, the data wiped out in the blackout itself involves a loss of memory (“all our memory bearings from the time, they were all damaged (...) in the blackout”). Memory, and lack of it, permeates place, where from the post-blackout Las Vegas Deckard remembers it as somewhere you could “forget your troubles.” Memory is a commodity, called upon and consumed by the Wallace Corporation, purchased from the memory-maker, Dr Ana Stelline, who constructs and implants “the best memories” in replicants so as to instil in them real human responses. Memory is ubiquitous in Blade Runner 2049, involving humans, replicants, objects, and machines. Even “God,” we are told, “remembered Rachael.” Nowhere, though, is the depiction of memory more important than in the attempt to solve a question of identity. Officer K has a memory of his past. Even though he knows it is an implant, it is a memory he is emotionally attached to, frequently narrating it to Joi, his digital girlfriend. But it is a memory that starts to puzzle and trouble him. When K discovers the remains of a dead replicant, a female NEXUS-7, he uncovers a secret—this replicant was pregnant and died during childbirth, a discovery that could “break the world.” K is charged with hunting down the child and making the problem disappear. Yet as K starts seeking answers to the question of the child’s identity he gets inextricably caught up in the mystery. Is he merely Officer K, or is he Joe, the miracle child of Rachael and Deckard? The answer to this question hinges on K’s memory. But is the memory genuine? Is the memory his? Blade Runner 2049 encourages us to think deeply about the nature of memory, identity, and the relation between them. Indeed, the film does not just serve as a starting point for thinking about philosophical issues related to memory and identity. Rather, as we show in this chapter, the film seems to offer a view on these philosophical issues. Blade Runner 2049 offers us a view of memory as spread out over people, objects, and the environment, and it shows us that memory’s role in questions of identity goes beyond merely accurately recalling one’s past. Identity depends not on memory per se, but partly on what we use memory for. (shrink)

Hume's brilliant and dispassionate essay Of Miracles has been added in this expanded edition of his _Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion_, which also includes Of the Immortality of the Soul, Of Suicide, and Richard Popkin's illuminating Introduction.

À propos du livre récent de Marlène Albert Llorca, Les Vierges miraculeuses, l’auteur survole rapidement les conclusions de recherches récentes sur l’image religieuse dans l’Europe traditionnelle. Il examine les manières dont les dévots convertissent des images en objets cultuels en les associant à des laïcs importants et aux sanctuaires qui les accueillent. Il commente les conclusions d’Albert Llorca selon lesquelles ces images, vêtues pour la circonstance, peuvent servir à répliquer le “miracle” originel pour les dévots qui manipulent ces vêtements ; (...) ainsi se rejouent les événements miraculeux censés être à l’origine du charisme de l’image. C’est donc l’imaginaire de la communauté, incarné dans les “cameraras” qui habillent l’image, qui dote celle-ci de pouvoirs miraculeux. (shrink)

Bayes's theorem is a tool for assessing how probable evidence makes some hypothesis. The papers in this volume consider the worth and applicability of the theorem. Richard Swinburne sets out the philosophical issues. Elliott Sober argues that there are other criteria for assessing hypotheses. Colin Howson, Philip Dawid and John Earman consider how the theorem can be used in statistical science, in weighing evidence in criminal trials, and in assessing evidence for the occurrence of miracles. David Miller argues (...) for the worth of the probability calculus as a tool for measuring propensities in nature rather than the strength of evidence. The volume ends with the original paper containing the theorem, presented to the Royal Society in 1763. (shrink)

This is an introduction to a collected volume. It distinguishes between evidential, statistical, and physical probability, and between objective and subjective understandings of evidential probability, in the use of Bayes’s theorem. If Bayes’s theorem is to be used to assess an objective evidential probability, a priori criteria--mainly the criterion of simplicity--are required to determine prior probability. The five main contributors to the volume discuss the use of Bayes’s theorem to assess the evidential probability of scientific theories, statistical hypotheses, criminal guilt, (...) and miracles; and also its value for assessing physical probability. (shrink)

The Protestant Christianity that came to China in the 19th century was mostly a “modernizing” Christianity that promoted the transition to what Charles Taylor calls an “immanent frame”—a disenchanted world based on natural laws, knowable through scientific reason, which can be used by humans for their mutual benefit. Within this immanent frame, religion is a matter of private belief that cultivates good personal moral character. And there is no place for “signs and wonders”—miracles that suspend the laws of nature. (...) But Chinese modernity has turned out to be a hybrid kind. Especially (but by no means exclusively) in the countryside, the immanent modernity brought from the West has mingled with the enchanted world carried down from Chinese traditions. One sign of this is the prevalence of “signs and wonders” popular Christianity, which has been the most rapidly growing form of Christianity in China. The history of Catholicism in China has similarities to these developments. (shrink)

There is a good a priori argument for the doctrine of the Trinity, from the need for any divine being to have another divine being to love suffi ciently to provide for him a third divine being whom to love and by whom to be loved. But most people who have believed the doctrine of the Trinity have believed it on the basis of the teaching of Jesus as interpreted by the church. The only reason for believing this teaching would (...) be if Jesus led the kind of life which a priori we would expect an incarnate God to live in order to identify with our suffering, make atonement for our sins, and to reveal truth to us; culminated by a miracle which God alone could do and which would also authenticate the teaching. Given good a posteriori evidence for the existence of God, there is enough historical evidence to make it probable that Jesus did live that sort of life, and so to believe the doctrine of the Trinity. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne and Robert Larmer have offered different natural theological arguments for preferring Christian belief over Muslim belief. This paper argues that both arguments are vulnerable to real and imagined Muslim objections and that, while both can be bolstered against such objections, Larmer’s argument from miracle has much better prospects. Swinburne’s probabilistic argument suffers the lack of a strong natural theological argument for the Christian model of divine–human interaction. The argument from miracle, however, can be formulated robustly enough to (...) withstand the challenge of the strongest reasonable Muslim miracle account. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne: Introduction Elliott Sober: Bayesianism - its scopes and limits Colin Howson: Bayesianism in Statistics A P Dawid: Bayes's Theorem and Weighing Evidence by Juries John Earman: Bayes, Hume, Price, and Miracles David Miller: Propensities May Satisfy Bayes's Theorem 'An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances' by Thomas Bayes, presented to the Royal Society by Richard Price. Preceded by a historical introduction by G A Barnard.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophy of Bishop Stillingfleet RICHARD H. POPKIN EDWARD STILLINGFLEET(1635-1699), the Bishop of Worcester, is known only as Locke's opponent. Although he was a leading figure in seventeenth century intellectual history, he is now almost completely forgotten.1 He is only mentioned once in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy as the first person to write against Deism. 2 His texts have been ditlicult to locate, and have hardly been studied. (...) Although Locke's answers to him comprise a large volume in Locke's Works, little interest has been shown in Stillingfleet's side of the story. His letters to Locke were last printed in the 1710 edition of his works. (I am now publishing a photoreproduction edition of the attacks on Locke, and a photoreproduction of the six volumes of his works is due soon.) In spite of this neglect, Stillingfleet was a quite interesting figure. He was not a simple moss-back, a religious reactionary, fighting progressive theories like Locke's. Rather, he was trying to maintain some basis for religious belief in the face of the intellectual upheavals in the seventeenth century. For over forty years he struggled against a wide range of philosophical and theological developments of the time that he saw as leading to scepticism and infidelity. Stillingfleet attempted to defend the reasonableness of Christianity in an intellectual world dominated by the new science, the new philosophy, the religious wars, the rise of irreligion, Bible criticism, and Spinozism. In the new scientific, philosophical and theological context he sought to show how an intelligent, reasonable man could maintain his religious views as more probable than their denials. And, he tried to show the perils involved in various new lines of thought. As he wrote to Locke, "in an age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are so much exposed by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of Certainty as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtJull than before." 3 Stillingfleet criticized various new views of thinkers like Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, and tried to show that they were unreasonable and x No section is devoted to Stillingfleet in Charles de R~musat's Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu'gt Locke, 2 vols. (Paris, 1875). He is of course briefly treated by Locke scholars, but only in relation to Locke. 2 Ernest C. Mossner, "Deism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy ('New York, 1967), II, 328. 3 Edward StiUingfleet,The Bishop o~ Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter (London, 1697), pp. 37-38. [303] 304 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY destructive. Instead he advocated a commonsense philosophy incorporating Aristotelian and Stoic elements, as an adequate basis for a reasonable view of the world. Stillingflect's critique of empiricism, in its Epicurean and Lockean forms, revealed some of the basic difficulties in this emerging philosophy. His own views in some ways foreshadowed the counter-philosophy that Thomas Reid was to offer a century later against the full-blown empirical scepticism of Hume. And Hume's essay "Of Miracles" can, I believe, be seen as the reductio ad absurdum of Stillingfleet's commonsense philosophy. In this paper I shall try to sketch out Bishop Stilhngfleet's philosophy, and to indicate the role it played in the history of British empirical thought. The Bishop's attack on Locke only occurred at the very end of his long and fruitful intellectual career. (He died during the debate in 1699.) To appreciate why he was so concerned with exposing the sceptical and irreligious tendencies in Locke's thought, and the potential conflicts between empiricism and the tenets of Judeo-Christianity, one has to look at his entire theological and philosophical career. Stillingfleet was one of the most erudite divines of the seventeenth century, a leading member of the brilliant group of Anglican theologians, including, besides himself, William Chillingworth, Bishop John Wilkins (the founder of the Royal Society), and Archbishop John Tillotson.4 Stillingfleet was extremely sensitive to the fundamental issues being raised in the religious, scientific and philosophical debates of the time, and tried, like his fellow Anglican divines, to develop a commonsense semirational, semiempirical defense... (shrink)

Until now, no one has unlocked the profound secrets of this wise and witty adventure tale. If you've wondered why men of action shouldn't lie, how the Battle of Wits could have turned out differently, what a rotten miracle would look like and whether it would amount to malpractice, or how Westley could have killed a lot of innocent people and still be a good guy, then The Princess Bride and Philosophy has all the answers"--P. [4] of cover.

The Princess Bride is the 1987 satirical adventure movie that had to wait for the Internet and DVDs to become the most quoted of all cult classics. The Princess Bride and Philosophy is for all those who have wondered about the true meaning of “Inconceivable!,” why the name “Roberts” uniquely inspires fear, and whether it’s truly a miracle to restore life to someone who is dead, but not necessarily completely dead. The Princess Bride is filled with people trying to persuade (...) each other of various things, and invites us to examine the best methods of persuasion. It’s filled with promises, some kept and some broken, and cries out for philosophical analysis of what makes a promise and why promises should be kept. It’s filled with beliefs which go beyond the evidence, and philosophy can help us to decide when such beliefs can be justified. It’s filled with political violence, both by and against the recognized government, and therefore raises all the issues of political philosophy. Westley, Buttercup, Prince Humperdinck, Inigo Montoya, the giant Fezzik, and the Sicilian Vizzini keep on re-appearing in these pages, as examples of philosophical ideas. Is it right for Montoya to kill the six-fingered man, even though there is no money in the revenge business? What’s the best way to deceive someone who knows you’re trying to deceive him? Are good manners a kind of moral virtue? Could the actions of the masked man in black truly be inconceivable even though real? What does ethics have to say about Miracle Max’s pricing policy? How many shades of meaning can be conveyed by “As You Wish”? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 263 Blaise Pascal, Pensdes sur la Religion et sur quelques autres su/ets. Edited by Jean Steinmann. (Monaco: Editions du Rocher, 1961. Pp. 505 + tables and 3 portraits of Pascal. 16.80 N.F.) This edition of the Pensdes by the late Abb~ Steinmann claims to be the first to utilize the radical discoveries of Tourneur and Lafuma and to incorporate the revisions of the text resulting from their (...) work, while presenting a readable Pascal, unencumbered by tons of erudition. The achievement of Tourneur and Lafuma is one of the most remarkable of modern scholarship. They have shown that the standard text of Pascal was not that which the author left to posterity, and that the manuscript copy (not in Pascal's hand) in the Biblioth~que National, 9203, preserves Pascal's original organization to the extent that he had completed his work, and preserves Pascal's order of the remaining fragments; whereas the holograph manuscript, BN.9202, represents a posthumous ordering of the materials from the early eighteenth century. On the basis of a really fantastic amount of detailed analysis of the paper, the ink, the glue, etc., Tourneur and Lafuma have brought about a monumental revision of the text of one of France's major classics, three centuries after the author's death. It is now finally possible, after a wide variety of reconstructions over a period of almost 300 years since the first edition of the Pensdes, to read the work as Pascal left it, and to see it in the form that Pascal had given it. The revised edition put out by I.afuma in 1951 was primarily a scholar's edition, incorporating all the details that were vital in convincing people that BN.Ms.9203 was the correct text, and that it contained a mine of information about variants. The present edition by Steinmann is an attempt to present the revised text without all of the encumbrances of scholarship, thereby preserving the Pens~es as a readable document. This edition is elegantly printed, following the main classifications of the Lafuma edition, with some of the variants appearing in the margins, and lots of notes in the back giving translations of Biblical and other texts, and some relevant data. In some of the sections the order of the Pens~es differs to some extent from Lafuma's text, and no explanation is offered for the variation. The excellent printing, separation of variants from text, and the absence of footnotes certainly make Steinmann's edition easily readable. The volume includes a section of personal notes of Pascal not intended for publication ("The Memorial," "Mystery of Jesus," and other items), twenty-seven sections classified by Pascal, and the unclassified Pens~es, given in the order of BN.Ms.9203 (excluding the sections on miracles, on the grounds that these were not intended as part of the same work). One grave difficulty in using any of the revised editions is that of locating passages known according to their numbers in the Brunschvicg edition. Stcinmann offers a concordance which is only partially helpful, giving the pages in his edition on which the Brunschvicg items appear. This makes it difficult to identify the Brunschvicg equivalent of one of Steinmann's passages, but not vice versa. This problem, and several others, have been solved in a more recent edition done by Lafuma (Pascal, Oeuvres completes, Macmillan, 1963). Lafuma has presented the text with each pens~e having two numbers, its new one as it appears in the revised text and its Brunschvicg number. (Thus the crucial text on the Wager is now 418-233. Steinmann did not number the individual pens~es.) The variants are given in parentheses in italics, and other features of the author's original are preserved without causing confusion or clutter. On the whole, if one wants to read the "new" Pensdes, with enough additional data, guidelines, and the like, this most recent Lafuma edition seems preferable to Steinmann's because it is more scholarly, and yet easier to follow with the notes, the variants and the numbers 264 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY right at hand, without getting in the way. If it had been printed in... (shrink)

Since becoming the globe’s most populous city in the early eighteenth century, Tokyo has risen, collapsed and boomed again as no other metropolis. For 300 years spectacular bursts of growth occurred against a background of earthquakes, fires and floods, until in 1923 a horrific quake wiped it out. The bombing of the rebuilt city in 1945 was deadlier than the atomic attacks on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Relative seismic and political stability after the war underpinned an economic miracle and transformed Tokyo (...) into a global business and cultural icon, but the ‘lost decades’ that followed brought back socioeconomic uncertainty and undercurrents of anxiety. Manmade calamities, including a terrorist attack on the subway in 1995 and a nuclear leak in a neighboring prefecture in 1999, shook confidence in a city that normally enjoys high health and safety standards, while the massive earthquake and tsunami in Fukushima in 2011, just 240 km away, reminded inhabitants of the tectonic time bomb underneath them. Not surprisingly, physical, social and psychological fragility feature prominently in cinematic portrayals of Tokyo, with destruction and reconstruction of the cityscape and of the lives of those who inhabit it a common theme. Cinematic stories typically revolve around characters dwelling on the past, living cautiously for the moment or fearing the future. This paper explores how directors have incorporated physical destruction and socioeconomic devastation into their depictions of the city, focusing particularly on the use of images of the built environment. (shrink)

God has major reasons for intervening in human history by becoming incarnate himself—to identify with our suffering, to provide atonement for our sins, and to reveal truths. Given there is at least a significant probability that there is a God, there is at least a modest probability that he would become incarnate and live a life and provide teaching appropriate to one who sought thereby to realize these goals. Jesus lived and taught in the appropriate way. If it was God (...) incarnate who did so live and teach, he would need to show us that it was God who had done so, and so could be expected to put his signature on that life and teaching by a super-miracle, such as the Resurrection. So there is a modest prior probability in advance of considering the direct historical evidence of the Resurrection, to expect that it would happen to someone who lived and taught as Jesus did. Jesus is the only person in human history about whom there is significant evidence both that he led the appropriate kind of life, and that his life was culminated by a super-miracle. So we do not need too many witnesses to the empty tomb or too many witnesses who claimed to have talked to the risen Jesus, to make it probable that Jesus did indeed rise. We do have some such witness evidence, which it is very improbable would occur unless the Resurrection occurred. In consequence it is overall very probable that the Resurrection occurred. (shrink)

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism all claim that God has given humans a revelation. Divine revelation may be either of God, or by God of propositional truth. Traditionally Christianity has claimed that the Christian revelation has involved both of these. God revealed himself in his acts in history; for example in the miracles by which he preserved the people of ancient Israel, and above all by becoming incarnate as Jesus Christ, who was crucified and rose from the dead. And God (...) also revealed to us propositional truths by the teaching of Jesus and his church. Some modern theologians have denied that Christianity involves any propositional revelation, but there can be little doubt that from the second century until the eighteenth century, Christians and non-Christians were virtually unanimous in supposing that it claimed to have such a revelation, and so it is worthwhile investigating its traditional claim. This article is concerned with the Christian claim to have a propositional revelation. The first section describes the process by which Christians of past centuries have come to believe that certain propositions have been revealed. The second assesses alternative philosophical accounts of what constitutes a belief that such-and-such propositions have been revealed, being a ‘justified’ belief. (shrink)

O artigo discute a forma de um argumento em favor da ressurreição de Jesus do modo como o Cristianismo acredita que esta ocorreu, o qual, se bem-sucedido, seria um forte indício histórico da existência de Deus. O artigo sustenta que Deus teve boas razões para se encarnar por certos propósitos e que, se assim ele o fez, ele viveria um certo tipo de vida como um ser humano, que seria culminada por um supermilagre como sua ressurreição. Se encontrarmos um e (...) apenas um ser humano em toda a história sobre o qual haja uma quantidade modesta de indícios do tipo que se esperaria se ele viveu aquele tipo de vida e uma modesta quantidade de indícios do tipo a ser esperado se aquela vida fosse culminada por um supermilagre como a ressurreição, isso é um indício bem forte de que aquele ser humano era Deus encarnado. Assim, aqueles indícios aumentariam significativamente a probabilidade de que Deus existe.This article discusses the form of an argument for the Resurrection of Jesusas Christianity believes it occurred, which, if successful, would be strong historical evidence for the existence of God. The article argues that God had good reason to become incarnate for certain purposes, and that if he did he would live a certain kind of life as a human, which would be culminated by a super-miracle such as his resurrection. If we find one and only one human in all history about whom there is a modest amount of evidence of a kind to be expected if he lived that kind of life and a modest amount of evidence of a kind to be expected if that life was culminated by a super-miracle such as the resurrection, that is very strong evidence that that human was God incarnate. Hence that evidence would greatly increase the probability that there is a God. (shrink)

The hypothesis that Jesus rose bodily from the dead is rendered probable in so far as: (1) evidence makes it probable that there is a God, (2) God has reason to become incarnate - to provide atonement for our sins, to identify with our suffering, and to reveal teaching (and so to lead a particular kind of human life, including teaching that he was divine and making atonement, a life culminated by a super-miracle such as his resurrection from the dead), (...) (3) there is evidence of a modest degree of probability to be expected if Jesus was the only prophet in human history who led a life of the above kind, which was culminated in the right sort of way. So, given other evidence that there is a God (and a priori reason to suppose that he would become incarnate),and other evidence about the life of Jesus and other prophets, only a modest amount of historical witness testimony to the Resurrection is necessary in order to show that it occurred. (shrink)

In The Miracle of Theism Mackie attempts to defend Hume's argument concerning the rationality of accepting a miracle on the basis of testimony. He does this by first offering a precise account of what miracles and laws of nature are, and then by claiming that this implies that any evidence for a law of nature is also evidence against the miracle occurring. I argue that Mackie has committed a simple logical fallacy. Given Mackie's account of miracles and laws (...) of nature, it does not follow that our evidence for natural laws makes it unlikely that a miracle occurred. (shrink)

With A Defense of Hume on Miracles Robert Fogelin enters the recent discussion on Hume’s treatment of miracles. In this short book Fogelin begins by presenting his interpretation of Hume’s argument concerning miracles. The second chapter is a lengthy treatment of recent work by David Johnson and John Earman, and the third short chapter is a discussion of the relation of Hume’s view on miracles to his broader philosophy. There are also two appendices and the text (...) of “Of Miracles.”. (shrink)